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December 31, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR

BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT E. PURSLEY,
MILITARY ASSISTANT TO THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Questions and Answers for the President's Television
Network Interview on January 4, 1971

Per our conversation, would you please provide by close of business today answers to questions along the general lines of those on the attached sheet. It would be particularly helpful if you could provide factual information on SS-9 deployments ~~which~~ suggested answer to the SALT question.

Answers to any other questions which you think are likely to be raised will be greatly appreciated.

OSD Review Completed

Alexander M. Haig
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

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Questions for the President's Television Network Interview
January 4, 1971

1. SALT Negotiations

Q: What are the prospects for a SALT agreement? How do you interpret the slowdown in Soviet SS-9 missile deployment?

2. Understanding with the Soviet Union on Cuba

What kind of understanding do we have with the Soviet Union regarding Soviet military activity in Cuba?

3. Defense Spending

Secretary Laird has hinted that the DOD budget will be increased substantially in FY 1972. With SALT talks under way and withdrawals from Vietnam continuing, why can't defense expenditures be decreased?

4. Draft Calls

Your Administration is committed to ending the draft as soon as possible. Yet, I understand that draft calls in January, 1971, will be twice as high as they were in late 1970. Could you explain this apparent inconsistency?

5. Strategy of Realistic Deterrence

In his December 28 press conference, Secretary Laird mentioned that a new strategy called "realistic deterrence" would be formulated and presented to Congress over the coming year. Could you enlarge on this strategy and tell us what implications it will have?

6. Bombing North Vietnam

In your December 10 press conference, you declared that you wanted no misunderstanding over what you would do if North Vietnam developed and used the capacity to increase the fighting in South Vietnam, or fired on our reconnaissance aircraft operating over North Vietnam -- you said that you would order

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6. (Cont'd)

the bombing of selected targets in the North. Were you then changing or expanding the terms of the understanding reached with Hanoi on the 1968 bombing halt?

7. Our Leverage on POW's Under Vietnamization

Are you not concerned that you will lose whatever leverage we have to get our POW's released as our troops are reduced further and further under the Vietnamization program? It seems there is a real risk that we will end up with our troops withdrawn from Vietnam but our prisoners still in Hanoi's hands.